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Descriptors - * Administration, * Administrative Organization, * Decision Making, * Governance, * Higher Education Contemporary issues in campus governance are part of a long chain of history. Our ways of perceiving the environment create trained incapacities which make it very difficult for us to see the world in any other way. Administrators, faculty and students all operate on the principle of "self-fulfilling prophecy"--or, according to their "perceptual set." There are various alternative patterns of governance but faculty and administrators will have to alter their perceptual sets if they are to be put into practice. One is the notion of a central committee consisting of faculty, student and administration representatives and some trustee representation; another pattern is the joint long-range planning committee composed of the same groups. The questions of what criteria should be used to justify participation in governance and how to define the limits of the university community must be faced. Despite the growth of huge organizations, there is a strong move toward decentralization, breaking up large campuses into small units has been suggested. Some argue that administrators be given more power, and, perhaps, a clear allocation of responsibility would be desirable. The pattern of governance an institution adopts will depend upon its size, complexity of organization, amount of faculty commitment to campus and discipline. extent to which a clearly identified institutional purpose exists and role of internal and external organizations in decision making. Structure should flow from functions, (JS)

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CURRENT ALTERNATIVES IN CAMPUS GOVERNANCE

Unfortunately, most of us are unaware of the fact that contemporary issues in campus governance are part of a long chain of history. By examining this historical material, one is forced to the conclusion that in terms of new governance patterns, there is little new under the sun.

For example, there is considerable debate in higher education over the "proper" function of faculty senates - should they be advisory to the president or have decision-making power? Should they represent all the faculty or the tenured faculty? If their role is that of giving advice to the president, is he then obligated to follow it? If not, what function do they serve in representing a constituency?

These issues are by no means new. The Roman Senate was for the most part a council of elders (the root is Senectus, meaning aged, elderly, or infirm). Its original purpose was to provide the ruler with a council which gave counsel, but by the time of Cato, it had assumed almost complete domination of the decision-making machinery. There may be an historically validated tendency for senates to begin as advisory and end in a struggle for power with the ruler.

Whom does the senate represent? The Roman position is clear - The Senate is the elders, speaking each for himself, with only a limited idea of representation. On the other hand, there is St. Benedict in 529 A.D.:

Chapter 3. Of Calling the Bretheren to Council. As often as any important business has to be done in the monastery, let the abbot call together the whole community and himself set forth the matter. And, having heard the counsel of the bretheren, let him think it over by himself and then do what he shall judge to be the most expedient. Now the reason why we have said that all should be called to counsel is that God often reveals what is better to the younger... But if the business to be done in the interests of the monastery be of lesser importance, let him use the advice of the seniors only. It is written: Do all things with counsel, and thy deeds shall not bring thee repentence.

Most of the contemporary options are presented above - representative or direct participation, counsel or direct decision-making of senates, bodies of elders or young and old combined, the obligation of the executive to listen and decide. (This concept of the "absolute but not arbitrary king" is a fair parallel to the way some college presidents play their roles today.)

How many advisors should a ruler have? Here is Machiavelli:

But a prince who consults with more than one advisor, unless he be a wise man, will never know how to coordinate the advice given him. For each of his advisors will see the matter from his own point of view, and a stupid prince will be unable to make allowances and distinctions. Advisors are of necessity of such a nature because unless men are compelled to be good they will invariably turn out to be bad.²

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Another important point which even an amateur can learn from studying a short history of governance is that codification of procedures is not always a blessing. Men have always found it difficult to transcend the printed word, and a totally codified set of procedures may limit the view of what is possible, to the point where obedience to the codified procedures becomes an end in itself, rather than a means to more important ends. The existence of the ombudsman on campuses may signify a pathological dependence on codification of the unnecessary, establishing barriers to communication and trust which the ombudsman tries to bridge. Many have taken the position recently that technology is simply a device designed to make sure that we do not experience the world. The same could be argued for the bureaucratic structures which pervade most large colleges and universities — they allow people to pass each other without encounter, insulated by rules and procedures.

Leaving this historical material aside, I would like to attempt to build another framework for analysis using some notions from social psychology. One of the most interesting concepts which is relevant to our ultimate task of understanding governance is that of perceptual limits. In simple terms, the concept means that no information can come into our consciousness which we cannot process or handle, through classification of one sort or another. Thus when the ape in Kohler's classic experiment grabbed the two pieces of stick, slid them together, and reached outside his cage to grab the bananas which up to that point had eluded him, two very important things happened. First, he felt less hungry. Second, he could never look at sticks again as he had in his naive days. Every tree was no longer filled with branches, but with food-getting implements. To "see" trees in a different way, he will have to "unlearn" this perceptual pattern first. One of the great paradoxes of our perceptual systems is that while showing us the world, they also create by their existence trained incapacities which make it very difficult for us to see the world in any other way.

Our ways of perceiving the environment (which are also ways of creating our environment) have been analyzed from many points of view. Two that I would like to mention are those of Rokeach and Rosenthal. 3 Rokeach has stated that systems of perception exist in order to serve two functions - the first is to explain the world insofar as possible; the second is to protect the individual from the world insofar as necessary. We all have areas of the world in which the psychological "price" exacted for seeing what is really there is just too high for us to pay. I am sure that if each one of us thinks about it, he will think of some aspects of reality which he simply cannot afford to face. We can call this aspect displacement, cognitive dissonance, or many other terms. It is important, in that one major aspect of dissonance involves how others see us. The notions of honor and integrity do not mean a great deal in this realm; those who need to in order to maintain any identity at all will resort to the wearing of very large and thick blinders. These perceptual identities will shift during the life of the individual, or of a society: "Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new interests and look in new places. Even more important, during revolutions scientists see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before."4

The second perceptual notion I would like you to consider is that of Rosenthal. He got into his current research by pondering the so-called self-fulfilling prophecy — what we expect to happen will probably come to happen because we will act consistently with that set of expectations. To check this out, Rosenthal first gave identical rats to two psychologists who were conducting maze learning experiments. He told the first man that his rats had been bred to perform extremely well in mazes; the second man that his rats were from a retarded strain. Although the rats had identical heredities, the rats who were assumed by the experimenter to be quick maze learners turned out to be so, while the rats in the hands of the man



who believed them to be inferior turned in low scores. He next tried the experiment on human beings, going into public schools and telling some teachers that some of their students (actually selected at random) had performed well on a new test of intelligence. With nothing more than this to go on, scores from this group on all kinds of school testing and grading improved spectacularly, while a randomly selected control group showed only normal grade level gains. The experiment proves rather conclusively that teacher expectations alone can, and do, create student performance levels.

Why bother to talk like this to a group of skilled academic practitioners? For the simple reason that we all operate every day on the principle of the self-fulfilling prophecy, particularly in terms of governance structures. For example, we often carry around in our heads a metaphor of the university or college. Some assume it is like a business organization, and their vocabulary is borrowed from industry. Some see the campus as a city, and their descriptions use the language of politics. Others see it as a haven, an ivory tower, a high school with ash trays, a vocational certification agency for the American meritocracy, a social welfare agency, etc.

Clearly those who involve themselves in salary negotiations assume the metaphors of industrial organization. But as Millett has said, "The internal organization of a college or university does not resemble that of a steel company, a department store, a bank, or a hotel. Colleges and universities are different. They are different in institutional setting, in purpose, in operation, and hence in internal organization." The response to this argument is obvious: "But negotiation is the only way to settle differences with regard to faculty salary disputes." My answer would be - of course, because the metaphor of the college or university as industrial organization blocks out all the other metaphors with which we could perceive our situation.

For another example of this "perceptual map," consider the fact that when we think of state-wide systems of higher education, we tend to think of it as a single institution writ large. Just like a campus, the state system must have its chief executive officer, its trustees, its faculty senate. Let me suggest here that what we have created is a very new breed of cat (at least in New York and California) whose real identity is not yet known to us. However, our metaphors of it, our perceptual expectations of it, will have a major role in determining what its nature turns out to be. It is clear, at least from the California experience, that state systems cannot be run with the perceptual fields of the single campus.

On the campuses themselves, the students are proving out this approach. One of their major strategies is to make all the implicit rules and patterns explicit, so that we are forced to see them for ourselves. This strategy should not seem strange - it is after all the strategy of psychotherapy, in which the therapist holds up for the patient's scrutiny all the things which the patient has kept from himself. It is also the reason why people buy Warhol's pictures of scup cans and Brillo boxes - this is "like it is." So the students, who "know" that police are essentially violent people, arrange a confrontation and make the internal plain for all to see, and the self-fulfilling prophecy happens again. By engineering confrontations, students have often been able to prove their perceptions of adults, who act as the students thought they would.

These perceptual problems seem to me very difficult in adversary negotiations, in which again one creates the social reality in which he, and others, will work. What metaphors will we use? The metaphor of war seems convincing, even to the language - the strike as the "ultimate weapon" (shades of Herman Kahn!) the strategies of minimax, in which one plays for high win or low loss potential, but not



both at once, offense and defense strategies, etc. It is certainly a zero-sum game, in which the winnings of one must match the losings of the other. (The statement that all parties lose equally seems to me not quite justified by the facts of some settlements, and anyway, it would be better for everyone to win together than to lose together). Again, most wars are fought between only two enemies, or sets of allies. This is certainly not the model for curriculum and teaching negotiations, in which students, faculty, administration, and perhaps trustees have a stake. If the students want to get involved in academic decision—making, the faculty doesn't want them to, the administration does want them to and the board doesn't, then a new question appears — if there is a question ever who has legitimate reason to be involved in a decision—making area, then who decides who decides? I think that we are just beginning to see the consequences of that question for American life generally, and American higher education particularly.

Just sheer self-interest alone would suggest that students would have a concern for the quality of the educational experience - in fact, on questions about the educational experience, students ranked quality of teaching as their most important concern, while administrators, faculty, and department chairmen ranked it sixth or seventh. This is not to say that students are always right. But it does mean that we must alter the perceptual set which many faculty and administrators have that students are by definition wrong. It also is not enough to say that we will "listen" to students - after all, how much time would we invest in an activity for which the highest reward we could expect would be that someone might pay some attention to us? These are of course ego problems, and particularly in a heavily agegraded culture like our own, it is tough to admit that some bearded kid is brighter about some things than we are.

There are, I believe, some governance alternatives, although they are tied rather closely to conventionality, and we desperately need some utopian models to loosen up our thinking as to what is possible. One which has possibilities is the notion, now being tried on a number of campuses, of a central campus committee, consisting of representatives of the faculty, students and administration, with some trustee representation. Another very common pattern is the joint long-range planning committee, with the same groups represented, given the difficult task of bringing together the elements, both academic and logistical, for a ten-year plan of the institution's operation. These committees are forging new patterns of governance, although it is a little too early to see where they will lead. They represent a new notion of shared authority, very different from that of the AAHE task force report, Faculty Participation in Academic Governance, which is curious in its total neglect of students and their participation.

One problem which emerges here involves how we set the limits of those who have a stake in the institution which would justify their participation in governance where does the "campus community" end? With alumni? Businesses? The people of the state in the case of a public institution? And how do we plan the logistics of mass involvement? We have the technology to provide mass participation in every aspect of governance, but the governance behaviors which would make this kind of participation meaningful ("the electronic town meeting") has yet to be worked out. Labor-management behavioral forms we do understand, even though they provide for two-party arbitration and would leave the student and the alumnus out. But just as the Magalopolis is a new form of city which we have built but do not understand and cannot "run" (it clearly is running us at the moment), so we are building new educational structures which we cannot yet understand because we are applying the wrong metaphors. For example, I would guess that faith in representative forms of participation are becoming less satisfying for a large number of persons who want direct, not vicarious, involvement with all forms of governance. We must begin thinking along lines which would make direct participa-



tion not only possible but conventional. In fact, we must consider the most difficult question of all - for St. Benedict, the community was easy to define, but how do we define the <u>limits</u> of our new types of communities? Do we really mean that the university is to serve everyone? Or is this a dodge for our inability to set forth those groups or functions the university should not serve? Some are beginning to understand Kenneth Boulding's conception of the total global unit, consisting of all people and all governments, which he calls the "sociosphere." The megalopolis is a new level of human interaction which ignores city and state boundaries, as was seen in the eastern power failure of a year or so ago.

At the same time that these huge organizational entities are making their appearance, there is also present a strong move toward decentralization in both national government and campus governance. This is the solution offered by the report called The Culture of the University. This notion of "giving the government back to the people," seems to me to be overworking the metaphor of the New England town meeting. Even if a huge campus is divided up into small units for people to get to know each other, there must be a federated organizational system if the whole is to be governed at all. (In fact, there may be a need for a modern equivalent of the Federalist Papers, in which the reciprocity and autonomy of state and federal levels was staked out). If a campus of 30,000 students were to be transformed into 60 units of 500 each, there would have to be something which would hold the small units together, in at least a nominal way. Perhaps if functions could be clearly specified, a structure could be evolved which would allow the small unit a maximum of flexibility and autonomy, still realizing the bureaucratic efficiencies of central heating plants, libraries and food services. This is the approach advocated by Demerath et. al. in their interesting book, Power, Presidents, and Professors. 8 They see the need for both collegial and bureaucratic elements (combining the metaphors, perhaps, of the monastery and Sears Roebuck). The trick is to select those aspects of governance in which efficiency is supreme for bureaucratic treatment, while those in which value distinctions and goal rhetoric are most important will be handled through the assumptions of collegiality. (But because of the pervasiveness of the metaphors that guide our thinking, one wonders if Business Managers don't see everything along logistical lines while Deans of Students see everything along aspects of campus life and organization?)

Others have recently advocated that administrators be given more power, not less. This notion will probably not be eagerly accepted by students and faculty, but there is a point to be made - if administrative areas could be more carefully specified, so that everyone really knew who was responsible and accountable for what, this might be a major gain. Certainly the title of Dean or President today is so all-inclusive as to be useless. Some more functional titles should be developed. To the extent that collective negotiations clarifies the areas of administrative and faculty responsibility, that is a plus for bargaining as a process. (But arguing the Demerath position, one wonders whether the clarification contained in those 60-page agreements is in the right areas, or whether we are applying bureaucratic strategies to collegial problems).

Some have even argued that the existing structure of standing committees is designed mainly to create enough work to justify the committee's existence and impede change. Recommendations have been made that all committees be on an ad hoc, or "Kleenex" basis - if they serve no function, they should be thrown away. In this model, precedent would be intentionally limited, and the college would have to be recreated virtually from scratch every year, and modified every week. In my own opinion, precedent as a way of life is probably more evil than good, and therefore the structure of an organization should allow it to "hang loose" as much as possible. Precedent hastens the hardening of institutional arteries. On the other hand, people probably need some sense of established structure just for survival purposes. Perhaps we might want to deliberately create some "placebo" structures, which do not actually serve the



stated purpose but can fulfill others which may be just as vital. (For example, the Hopi rain dance seldom brings rain, but it provides for tribal identity, and gives one a chance to shake one's fist at the gods, which is pleasure I would like very much).

Which of these can best fit into a given institution will depend on the size of the campus, the complexity of the organization (which is not necessarily related to size), the amount of faculty commitment to campus and to discipline, the extent to which there is a clearly identified institutional purpose or purposes, and the role of internal and external organizations in decision-making. But one rule of thumb is that structures should flow from functions, and not the other way around.

One sad thing about the human creature is that with very few exceptions, change cannot be seen "on the way," but only after it has completely occurred. One need only think of strip mining in Pennsylvania, air and water pollution, and the ruining of millions of acres by voracious lumbering interests to realize that we could not "see" these consequences until it was too late. Because of the infinite number of consequences of every human and natural activity, our belief in planning the future is based on precious little evidence. If it is to succeed at all, we must all learn somehow to carry around as many different pictures in our heads as possible. Education has not been terribly successful in helping people to do this. Paradoxically, we believe in permanence and change, although we often mistake the one for the other. Perhaps the Bennington graduate was correct in her assessment of the college's future: "Keep it experimental, but don't change a thing."

NOTES

- 1. I am indebted to Paul Ward of the American Historical Association for his stimulating conversations on this topic. References from this page are from his privately circulated paper, "On the King's Taking Counsel." I am preparing an article which relates the Campus Governance Project research to presidential consultation styles.
- 2. The Prince, Crofts edition, pp. 70-71.
- 3. Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York, Basic Books, 1960); Robert Rosenthal, Pygmalion in the Classroom (1968). See also H. Hodgkinson, Education, Interaction, and Social Change (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1967)
- 4. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1962)
- 5. John D. Millett, The Academic Community (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1962)
- 6. It is interesting to observe that virtually all utopias written during the last thirty years (with the one exception of B.F. Skinner's Walden Two) have been antiutopias. Yet the utopian format is one which can open our minds to new ways of looking at problems.
- 7. Caleb Foote, et. al., The Culture of the University (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1969)
- 8. Demerath, et. al. Power, Presidents, and Professors (New York, Basic Books, 1967)